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Abstract 
The Lehane matter wound its way through the Cape Provincial Division of the High Court 
and reached the Supreme Court of Appeal. Mr Dunne, the Irish debtor who had taken up 
residence in the United States of America, ran an international web of companies, 
including Lagoon Beach Hotel, which operated a Cape Town hotel. He filed for chapter 7 
bankruptcy in the United States and soon was also bankrupted by the Irish High Court. 
The Irish official assignee, Lehane, applied to the Cape court for recognition and 
assistance, and succeeded at every stage of the South African proceedings. 
Initially, Steyn J recognised Lehane as the foreign trustee as though a sequestration order 
had been granted against Mr Dunne in terms of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936, thus 
diverging from the approach taken by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in 
Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (Bermuda). Subsequently, Yekiso J's 
approach to applying the Insolvency Act without derogating from its generality opens up 
the possibility of applying section 21 of the Insolvency Act to significant effect against Mrs 
Dunne's South African property. Yet the territorialist restriction in Yekiso J's order that only 
creditors with causes of action which arose in South Africa were entitled to claim against 
the insolvent estate excluded many foreign creditors, even those from the Republic of 
Ireland (Eire). 
Of the many issues raised by the Lagoon Beach Hotel company, two chosen for discussion 
in this case note are the possible application of the automatic stay under section 362 of 
the United States Bankruptcy Code 1978 to the South African proceedings, and the 
standing of Lehane because of the litigants' dispute whether Mr Dunne was domiciled in 
the United States or Ireland. 
Yekiso J and subsequently Leach JA held that the American automatic stay did not govern 
the South African proceedings. Significantly, the American and the Irish trustees were co-
operating with respect to proceedings in Ireland and South Africa that involved Mr Dunne. 
And Leach JA deftly deferred to the Irish court the decision regarding the application of 
the American automatic stay and its relevance to the Irish proceedings. 
As for the disputed domicile of Mr Dunne, Yekiso J and Leach JA both considered that Mr 
Dunne had retained his Irish domicile. Leach JA, though, went on to discuss the assistance 
that might cautiously be accorded to Lehane if Mr Dunne were domiciled elsewhere than 
in Ireland. Even then, the relevance of domicile could not be gainsaid. Comparison with 
the relevant judgments of the Irish courts shows that they also regarded Mr Dunne as 
having retained his Irish domicile and not having acquired a new domicile of choice in the 
United States. 
In the comments, it is pointed out that trustees appointed in countries other than the 
insolvent's domicile may still be recognised by South African courts. The insolvent's 
submitting to the jurisdiction of a court that is not the court of his domicile is discussed; on 
its facts, the cited authority does not bear out the relevant principle. Further, the possibility 
of recognising non-domiciliary trustees in exceptional circumstances and for exceptional 
convenience is explored. The cases cited in support of this principle are shown to yield 
differing results. 
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1 Introduction 
Mr Dunne is the central figure in concurrent bankruptcy proceedings in the 
United States of America and the Republic of Ireland (Eire). In South Africa 
the Irish official assignee of Dunne's Irish estate, Mr Lehane, applied to the 
courts for recognition and assistance. Progressing in stages through the 
Western Cape Division of the High Court, the Lehane matter arrived in the 
Supreme Court of Appeal.1  
After briefly stating the facts, this case comment moves on to Steyn J's 
provisional order in the Cape in September 20142 and places that judge's 
approach in the context of cross-border insolvency law. Soon the Lehane 
matter came before Yekiso J on the return date in October 2014,3 and 
features of that judge's order are commented on as regards its scope in 
relation to section 21 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 and the restriction of 
the relief to creditors whose causes of action arose wholly in South Africa. 
Yekiso J delivered his reserved judgment in January 2015.4 In November 
the Lehane matter reached the Supreme Court of Appeal,5 where Leach JA 
gave the judgment of the court in December. Among the various aspects of 
Yekiso J's judgment6 and Leach JA's,7 this case comment focuses on two – 
the automatic stay under American law, and the standing of Lehane to seek 
relief from the South African courts; both aspects were dealt with 
convincingly by the courts. The discussion of these aspects is 
supplemented by references, in footnotes, to the decisions of the Irish High 
Court8 and the Supreme Court of Ireland,9 for the light that they throw on 
aspects of the Lehane matter. After some comments on further points of 
South African cross-border insolvency law regarding the concepts of 
submission to the jurisdiction of the foreign court and also the recognition of 
                                            
* Alastair Smith. BA, LLB (Rhodes), PhD (Edin). Professor, Department of Mercantile 
Law, School of Law, University of South Africa. E-mail: smithad@unisa.ac.za. 
1  Lagoon Beach Hotel v Lehane 2016 3 SA 143 (SCA) para 8 (hereafter the Lagoon 
case). 
2  Ex parte Lehane (unreported) case number 15678/2014 of 2 September 2014, as 
described in Lehane v Lagoon Beach Hotel (Pty) Ltd 2015 4 SA 72 (WCC) para 6 
(hereafter the Lehane 2015 case) and the Lagoon case para 6. 
3  Lehane v Lagoon Beach Hotel (Pty) Ltd 2014 ZAWCHC 203 (17 October 2014) 
(hereafter the Lehane 2014 case). 
4  The Lehane 2015 case. 
5  See the Lagoon case. 
6  The Lehane 2015 case. 
7  The Lagoon case. 
8  In the matter of Dunne (a Bankrupt) 2013 IEHC 583 (6 December 2013). 
9  In the matter of Sean Dunne (a Bankrupt) 2015 IESC 42 (15 May 2015). This court is 
the Irish court of final appeal (Supreme Court of Ireland 2016 
http://tinyurl.com/guqp2xo). 
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a non-domiciliary trustee in exceptional circumstances, points that serve to 
highlight the importance of domicile in the South African common law of 
cross-border insolvency, a conclusion brings this contribution to a close. 
2 The facts of the Lehane matter 
Mr Dunne, a businessman formerly resident in the Republic of Ireland, had 
moved to the United States. His international web of companies and trusts10 
included shares in an Irish company, Mavior, owner of all the shares in 
Lagoon Beach Hotel (Pty) Ltd, which ran a Cape Town hotel.11 Mr Dunne 
had used Mavior to lend funds to Lagoon, and transferred his Lagoon 
interests to his wife in two contracts and dispositions in 2005 and 2008. In 
2013 he sought chapter 7 bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Code 1978 in 
the United States,12 where Mr Coan was appointed trustee. Soon 
afterwards, Mr Dunne was also bankrupted by the Irish High Court in Dublin, 
and Lehane was appointed there. 
Lehane heard that Lagoon was about to sell its assets and/or its shares (and 
its loan account) in South Africa. So he applied to the Cape court for 
provisional orders to recognise him as Mr Dunne's foreign trustee and to 
interdict Lagoon from disposing of the proceeds of the sale, pending the 
outcome of Irish proceedings to impeach the 2005 and 2008 transactions 
as fraudulent. 
3 The order of Steyn J in Ex parte Lehane13 
In Ex parte Lehane Steyn J authorised Lehane, once he had furnished 
security, to administer Mr Dunne's South African property. Lehane as the 
foreign insolvency representative was accorded all rights under the 
Insolvency Act 24 of 1936,14 as though a South African court had issued a 
                                            
10  The outdated and incomplete Wikipedia page for Sean Dunne gives an idea of his 
interests and connections: Wikipedia 2016 http://tinyurl.com/zgso89k. 
11  The Lagoon case para 2. 
12  This step was strategic, not least because honest debtors may expect an American 
discharge from their debts within one year, sooner than the three years under Irish law 
(see O'Donovan 2013 http://tinyurl.com/h53c5ls; NAMA Wine Lake 2013 
http://tinyurl.com/zq2c76k). Mr Dunne filed for American bankruptcy knowing full well 
that Irish bankruptcy proceedings against him were imminent (In the matter of Dunne 
(a Bankrupt) 2013 IEHC 583 (6 December 2013) para 85 per McGovern J in the Irish 
High Court, in dismissing Dunne's argument to have the Irish bankruptcy proceedings 
set aside). Although Mr Dunne "was due to exit bankruptcy at the end of [July 2016]", 
on 11 July 2016 the Irish bankruptcy was extended by the High Court at the request 
of Lehane, alleging that Mr Dunne was not co-operating (Anon 2016 
http://tinyurl.com/jhp4tsy; O'Faolain 2016 http://tinyurl.com/hqekjbg). 
13  As described in the Lehane 2015 case para 6 and the Lagoon case para 6. 
14  Including those under s 64 on the attendance of meetings by the insolvent and others, 
s 65 on the interrogation of the insolvent and other witnesses, s 66 on the enforcing 
of summonses and the giving of evidence, section 69 on the trustee's duty to take 
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sequestration order on 29 July 2013, the date on which the Irish court 
appointed him as official assignee. 
This important order by Steyn J should be placed in the context of recent 
developments in cross-border insolvency law. The order, conferring wide 
powers upon Lehane as though a local sequestration order applied, typifies 
the approach of South African courts in applying the Insolvency Act as 
though it does apply to the facts under a sequestration order, even though 
a local sequestration order is not issued. This approach was disapproved of 
by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Singularis Holdings Ltd v 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (Bermuda).15 In that appeal, Lord Collins in 
particular stated that this approach of applying a statute "as if" it did apply 
when on its wording it did not apply to the facts amounted to legislating from 
the bench and thus intruded on the sphere of the legislature.16 The approach 
taken by the South African Appellate Division17 was not approved.18 Still, 
the South African approach of applying the Insolvency Act and the 
legislation on companies remains flexible and assists foreign insolvency 
representatives, as in the Lehane matter with respect to a natural person. 
But the approach places South African law at odds with the narrower 
approach that applies in jurisdictions where Singularis is binding authority.19 
4 The order by Yekiso J in Lehane v Lagoon Beach Hotel 
(Pty) Ltd20 
The order by Yekiso J in October 2014 raises questions about the 
application of certain sections of the Insolvency Act to the facts of the 
matter.  
4.1 The possible relevance of section 21 of the Insolvency Act to 
the facts of the Lehane matter 
Yekiso J applied the Insolvency Act with the necessary changes,21 
"without derogating from the generality thereof". Specified sections of 
the Insolvency Act were also listed. The quoted phrase, "without 
                                            
charge of the estate property, and s 82 on the sale of estate property after the second 
meeting of creditors. 
15  Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (Bermuda) 2014 UKPC 36 (10 
November 2014), 2015 2 WLR 971 (hereafter the Singularis case). 
16  The Singularis case paras 78-79. 
17  Moolman v Builders and Developers (Pty) Ltd (in Provisional Liquidation): Jooste 
Intervening 1990 1 SA 954 (A). 
18  See the judgments of Lord Sumption JSC and Lord Mance JSC in the Singularis case 
in paras 24 and 143, respectively. 
19  For further discussion of the Singularis case, see Smith 2016 Obiter 167-186. 
20  The Lehane 2014 case. 
21  The Lehane 2014 case para 3. 
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derogating from the generality thereof", may be interpreted as applying 
the entire Insolvency Act to the facts. Previously, section 21 of the 
Insolvency Act, governing the property of the solvent spouse in a 
marriage out of community of property, had been held by Goldstone J 
not to be intended to apply extra-territorially.22 Statutes are generally 
assumed not to apply extra-territorially, and they apply in their area of 
enactment;23 comity recognises assignments in bankruptcy as being 
effective in another country.24 
The orders of Steyn J in Ex parte Lehane and Yekiso J in Lehane v 
Lagoon Beach Hotel (Pty) Ltd25 mention sections 64 to 66, 69 and 82 of 
the Insolvency Act, and Lehane was accorded rights under these 
sections. In addition, these sections are to be read together with the 
phrase quoted above: "without derogating from the generality thereof". 
Does this wording of the court order, read as a whole, imply that the 
court chooses whether section 21 of the Insolvency Act may also apply 
to the facts of the cross-border insolvency matter? On Goldstone J's 
reasoning in Viljoen v Venter,26 sections 64 to 66, 69 and 82 of the 
Insolvency Act, forming part of this Act, would not apply to the facts of 
Lehane either; yet Yekiso J's court order in Lehane v Lagoon Beach 
Hotel (Pty) Ltd27 applies them expressly to the Lehane matter. If this 
reasoning about judicial choice applies, the judge hearing the 
application by the foreign insolvency representative for recognition and 
assistance seems at liberty to decide whether, if necessary by express 
reference, some sections of the Insolvency Act will apply to the facts in 
question. It is conceded that the "rights and duties relating to the election 
and appointment of a trustee will not apply" in the Lehane matter.28 
Section 21 of the Insolvency Act, though, is not expressly excluded from 
applying to the Lehane matter. It has been stated that section 21 of the 
Insolvency Act is seen as not applicable under the cross-border 
insolvency law at common law;29 and that one difference introduced by 
the Cross-Border Insolvency Act 42 of 2000 renders section 21 of the 
                                            
22  Viljoen v Venter 1981 2 SA 152 (W) 154H-155A (hereafter the Viljoen case). 
23 Steyn Uitleg van Wette 133 n20; Bishop v Conrath 1947 2 SA 800 (T) 804. 
24  R v Etberg 1932 AD 142 145; Hymore Agencies Durban (Pty) Ltd v Gin Nih Weaving 
Factory 1959 1 SA 180 (D) 182H. 
25  The Lehane 2014 case. 
26  The Viljoen case 154H-155A. 
27  The Lehane 2014 case para 3. 
28  The Lehane 2014 case para 3.1. 
29  See Smith and Boraine 2002 Am Bankr Inst L Rev 196; Bertelsmann et al Mars 207 
n3; Kunst et al Meskin para 17.3.2.4 n4 read with para 17.4.5.4 n4. 
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Insolvency Act automatically applicable to foreign main proceedings.30 
If the reasoning about judicial choice is accepted, though, it seems open 
to a single judge in another division of the High Court, and to courts of 
appeal throughout South Africa on whom Goldstone J's ruling in Viljoen 
v Venter is not binding, to find that section 21 of the Insolvency Act does 
apply to the facts, if necessary by express mention, in a 
comprehensively worded order granted to a foreign insolvency 
practitioner by a South African court under the South African common 
law of cross-border insolvency. 
The Dunnes appear to be still married to each other. On 15 June 2014, 
Mrs Dunne told a newspaper reporter that she was still married to Mr 
Dunne.31 The application of section 21 of the Insolvency Act to a local 
application for recognition would mean that all the South African assets 
forming part of the solvent spouse's estate would automatically form part 
of the insolvent spouse's insolvent estate.32 The solvent spouse, Mrs 
Dunne, would then bear the burden of proving to the Irish official 
assignee, Lehane, that her South African assets should be released on 
various specified grounds,33 one of them being that Mrs Dunne had 
acquired the property during her marriage to Mr Dunne by a title valid 
against his creditors.34 A donation to protect the property against Mr 
Dunne's creditors and for his wife's security would be valid had the 
donation been entered into in good faith.35 As Lehane might disregard a 
simulated or collusive transaction intended to deceive or defraud 
creditors,36 it would then be important to establish, through interrogating 
the spouses, whether they knew about Mr Dunne's actual or imminent 
insolvency at the time of the contracts and dispositions in 2005 and 
2008.37 If Lehane could prove the necessary requirements, he might be 
able to resist Mrs Dunne's application for the release of her South 
African assets under section 21(2) of the Insolvency Act. Section 21 of 
the Insolvency Act might therefore provide a further weapon for Lehane 
                                            
30  See s 20(1)(d) of the Cross-Border Insolvency Act 42 of 2000. This statute is not yet 
fully in force, because the Minister has not promulgated the list of states to which the 
statute applies (s 2(2)-(5) of the Cross-Border Insolvency Act). 
31  Quinlan 2014 http://tinyurl.com/zf3uoyx and on 19 February 2016 Mr Aodhan 
O'Faolain reported that Ms Killilea Dunne, "wife of bankrupt developer Sean Dunne", 
had not succeeded in her application for her lawyers to be granted permission to cross-
examine Mr Coan's lawyer (O'Faolain 2016 http://tinyurl.com/h8d42sj). 
32  Section 21(1) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. 
33  Section 21(2) of the Insolvency Act. 
34  Section 21(2)(c) of the Insolvency Act. 
35  Rens v Gutman 2003 1 SA 93 (C). 
36  Jooste v De Witt 1999 2 SA 355 (T). 
37  Compare Beddy v Van der Westhuizen 1999 3 SA 913 (SCA) 916J-917G. 
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to have certain transfers set aside because they placed assets beyond 
the reach of Mr Dunne's creditors.38 
4.2 The restriction of the court order to claims by creditors whose 
whole cause of action arose in South Africa  
The further aspect of Yekiso J's order to comment on is paragraph 3.2, that 
only creditors whose whole causes of action arose within South Africa 
could under his court order acquire rights to prove claims. This order 
manifests the principle of territoriality in the South African cross-border 
insolvency law. Under this principle, the foreign insolvency 
representative administers the local assets under the directions of the 
South African court and administrative officials such as the Master of the 
High Court. Only any surplus remaining is transferred out of the South 
African jurisdiction to another jurisdiction where bankruptcy proceedings 
are running against the debtor.39 
The wording of paragraph 3.2 of this court order is restrictive, and prevents 
the filing of any claim whatsoever based on a non-South African cause of 
action. Creditors with a non-South African cause of action, such as those 
from the United States or the Republic of Ireland, would seem unable to 
instruct local South African lawyers to act for them in terms of an appropriate 
power of attorney. Not even South African creditors of Mr Dunne who had 
non-South African causes of action against him would be entitled to prove 
their claims in terms of paragraph 3.2 of the court order. 
5 Comments on the judgments of Yekiso J in the Lehane 
2015 case and Leach JA in the Lagoon case 
Next, this case comment discusses two aspects of the Lehane matter – the 
American automatic stay supposedly effective automatically throughout the 
world, and the standing of Lehane to seek relief, including an interdict, from 
the South African court, bearing in mind that Mr Dunne had previously filed 
for bankruptcy in America.40 
                                            
38  Compare the Irish impeachment proceedings mentioned in the Lagoon case para 7; 
also see Kunst et al Meskin para 17.3.2.1 n5. 
39  See, for example, Smith 2002 SA Merc LJ 17 para 3; Kunst et al Meskin para 17.1; 
Bertelsmann et al Mars para 30.2; Sharrock, Van der Linde and Smith Hockly para 
26.2. The territorial approach is implicitly supported in Ward v Smit: In re Gurr v 
Zambia Airways Corporation Ltd 1998 3 SA 175 (SCA) 179D (hereafter the Ward 
case); Kunst et al Meskin para 17.1 n7. 
40  Compare the Lehane 2015 case paras 42-51 and 52-57, respectively. 
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5.1 The automatic stay under American law 
Quite some space in the judgments by Yekiso J and Leach JA was devoted 
to considering whether the American automatic stay applied to Lehane's 
South African application and thus prevented the application from being 
pursued. It is submitted that the key to understanding this aspect of the case 
was mentioned as early as the first paragraph of Yekiso J's judgment: "His 
trustee in the US supports these proceedings".41 This aspect was identified 
                                            
41  The Lehane 2015 case. Further background is supplied by the decision of McGovern 
J (In the matter of Dunne (a Bankrupt) 2013 IEHC 583 (6 December 2013)) in 
explaining (para 81) that the US trustee, Coan, himself stated relevant facts that most 
of Mr Dunne's assets and liabilities were outside the USA, and all his real estate was 
in Ireland. More than $14 m worth of personal assets, and mostly in Ireland, was 
outside the USA. All his secured and priority claimants were Irish; the vast majority of 
his unsecured creditors, contract parties, and co-debtors resided in Ireland. Irish law 
might affect important issues in the bankruptcy. Coan argued for comity to be shown 
to the Irish bankruptcy proceedings, which were compatible with US law and policy, 
and that "an Irish bankruptcy case is necessary in this matter for an expeditious, 
economical and just liquidation of the bankruptcy estate and distribution of its property" 
(para 83 (original emphasis)). Coan proposed the adoption of a protocol to govern the 
administration of the bankrupt estate (para 86). A dual bankruptcy was thus approved 
by McGovern J (paras 75-76), who referred (para 76) to various authorities (Collins et 
al Dicey, Morris and Collins para 31-077; In re Thulin 1995 1 WLR 165 (English 
bankruptcy approved, despite Swedish bankruptcy), including the petitioner's citations 
(Ex parte Cridland 1814 3 V & B 94; Lyall v Jardine, Matheson & Co 1870 LR 3 PC 
318 (see also 1870 7 Moo PC NS 116, 17 ER 45); Re O’Reardon 1873 LR 9 Ch App 
74; Re Artola Hermanos 1890 24 QBD 640, and Re P MacFadyen & Co 1908 1 KB 
675). On appeal (In the matter of Sean Dunne (a Bankrupt) 2015 IESC 42 (15 May 
2015) per Laffoy J), the Supreme Court of Ireland discussed at length the issue of the 
jurisdiction of an Irish court to make an adjudication order where a bankruptcy in 
another state was running (paras 33-64). A distinction had to be drawn between "the 
jurisdiction to create a concurrent bankruptcy and the effect and consequences of 
doing so" (para 38). English law permitted a concurrent bankruptcy where a 
bankruptcy was already running in a state other than the domicile of the debtor (for 
example, Re Artola Hermanos 1890 24 QBD 640). In Ireland, the Cridland and 
O'Reardon cases showed that bankruptcies might co-exist there and in England (In 
the matter of Sean Dunne (a Bankrupt) 2015 IESC 42 (15 May 2015) paras 44-45). 
Having considered Irish legislation as not excluding jurisdiction to grant a bankruptcy 
solely because of a pre-existing foreign bankruptcy (paras 46-52), Lafoy J then 
referred to recent UK case law (Rubin v Eurofinance SA 2012 UKSC 46 (24 October 
2012), 2013 1 AC 236) on the principle of modified universalism, which foregrounded 
a single, unitary bankruptcy. The Supreme Court of Ireland had decided against 
judicial development rather than legislative development of the relevant cross-border 
insolvency principles (Re Flightlease (Ireland) Limited (in Voluntary Liquidation) 2012 
1 IR 722); the cautious judgment of Lord Sumption JSC in the Singularis case (para 
19) was also noted, that modified universality was limited by local law and policy, 
courts not being free to travel beyond their own statutory and common-law powers. 
Nevertheless, Lafoy J held that no legislative or common-law rule in the Republic of 
Ireland excluded the jurisdiction to bankrupt the debtor simply because of a pre-
existing foreign bankruptcy (In the matter of Sean Dunne (a Bankrupt) 2015 IESC 42 
(15 May 2015) para 58). On the further question of a protocol to be concluded between 
Coan and Lehane, Lafoy J held that it was unnecessary and inappropriate at this stage 
for the Supreme Court of Ireland to discuss the specifics, which might turn out to be 
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as the central point by Leach JA in remarking on the co-operation between 
the American and Irish trustees and the fact that the automatic stay had 
been lifted in order to allow the Irish proceedings to go ahead.42 Similarly, 
the American trustee gave his approval to the lifting of the automatic stay in 
respect of the South African application by Lehane.43 So it is submitted that 
it is unnecessary to explore the implications of differences of opinion in the 
expert evidence led before the Cape court and the Supreme Court of Appeal 
about the relevance of the American automatic stay to the South African 
application. The American trustee did not appear before the South African 
courts in order to oppose the relief that Lehane sought before these courts; 
and it could be argued that it was not Lagoon's place to raise such an 
objection on behalf of the American trustee. 
As Yekiso J observed,44 in any event section 362 of the American 
Bankruptcy Code applied to an action regarding a fraudulent transfer and 
the South African application was not for this form of relief. Still, it is 
submitted that Leach JA deftly resolved this point by explaining that it was 
                                            
complicated. The present litigants were the debtor and a major creditor of the debtor, 
and it was important to note that the American trustee was not before the Supreme 
Court of Ireland (para 62). It is submitted that the relevance of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (1997) and its local adaptation may also be 
pondered. That item of soft law has been adopted by South Africa (as explained in fn 
30 above) and by the USA (as ch 15 of the US Bankruptcy Code, which is fully in force; 
see LII 2016 http://tinyurl.com/ja2cpcb; Westbrook 2005 Am Bankr LJ 713), but not by 
the Republic of Ireland (see UNCITRAL 2016 http://tinyurl.com/z9s2zqm). If the USA 
and the Republic of Ireland were to feature in the Minister's list required by s 2(2)-(5) 
of the Cross-Border Insolvency Act in South Africa and that statute were thus relevant 
to facts such as those of the Lehane matter, it is submitted that the connections set 
out by McGovern J in the High Court (In the matter of Dunne (a Bankrupt) 2013 IEHC 
583 (6 December 2013) para 81) would indicate the Republic of Ireland as the centre 
of the debtor's (Mr Dunne's) main interests and the Irish bankruptcy proceedings 
therefore as the foreign main proceedings (s 17(2)(a) of the Cross-Border Insolvency 
Act). On this reasoning, there might, on the facts, be argument over whether the USA 
might be a place where Dunne as the debtor had an "establishment" ("a place of 
operations where [he] carries out non-transitory economic activity with human means 
and goods or services" (s 1(c) of the Cross-Border Insolvency Act)) and the US 
proceedings were thus foreign non-main proceedings (s 17(2)(b) of the Cross-Border 
Insolvency Act). The Irish proceedings would thus be privileged as regards the effects 
of the recognition of foreign main proceedings (s 20 of the Cross-Border Insolvency 
Act), including the automatic stay. The relevant provisions on co-operation with foreign 
courts and foreign representatives (ss 25-27 of the Cross-Border Insolvency Act) 
might be applied, and there would need to be the appropriate co-ordination of South 
African and foreign proceedings (ss 28-32 of the Cross-Border Insolvency Act). 
42  The Lagoon case paras 21-22. 
43  The Lagoon case para 22. 
44  The Lehane 2015 case para 50. 
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not the South African court's place or responsibility to take judicial notice of 
the American law or the Irish view on American law.45 
Part of the reasoning about the possible application of the automatic stay 
was based on the "… standard position … that the insolvent estate will fall 
into the jurisdiction of the first court which grants a sequestration order".46 
Sheldon was cited as authority.47 The principle is illustrated by the old Cape 
case Trustee of Howse, Sons & Co, Trustees of Howse, Sons & Co, 
Jocelyne v Shearer & Hine,48 in which the firm had had two domiciles. The 
winding-up petition was sought and a receiver appointed in London on 25 
August. The firm surrendered its Cape estate (comprising only movable 
property) in the Supreme Court of the Cape of Good Hope on 2 October, 
and Cape trustees were appointed on 29 October. The London trustee was 
appointed on 23 November. On 13 December the London Bankruptcy Court 
requested colonial courts' assistance in recognising the London trustee's 
appointment. The Cape court set aside the Cape trustees' appointment, 
and, among other things, declared that the Cape assets vested in the 
London trustee.49 
In the Lehane matter Mr Dunne filed for bankruptcy in America on 23 March 
2013. Although the Irish bankruptcy proceedings commenced on 12 
February, the Irish court granted an order only on 29 July.50 
Having dealt with the automatic stay, the discussion now turns to the 
standing of Lehane to apply to the South African court for recognition and 
assistance. 
                                            
45  The Lagoon case para 20. It is noted that the Supreme Court of Ireland did not regard 
the American automatic stay as preventing the institution of the Irish proceedings. It is 
submitted that such an argument may have been excluded by the express lifting of the 
automatic stay by Shiff J in the US proceedings in order to allow the Irish bankruptcy 
case to proceed (see In the matter of Sean Dunne (a Bankrupt) 2015 IESC 42 (15 
May 2015) para 7), as well as by the collaborative attitude of Coan towards the 
furtherance of the Irish proceedings. 
46  The Lagoon case para 18. 
47  Sheldon Cross-Border Insolvency paras 28-29. 
48  Trustee of Howse, Sons & Co, Trustees of Howse, Sons & Co, Jocelyne v Shearer & 
Hine 1884 3 SC 14 22-23 (hereafter the Howse case). 
49  Also see Smart Cross-Border Insolvency 343, on the vesting of movable property, with 
precedents cited from Scotland (Selkrig v Davies 1814 2 Rose 291, Selkrig v Davies 
1814 2 Dow PC 230, 3 ER 848; Geddes v Mowat 1824 1 Gl & J 414; Stewart v Auld 
1851 13 D 1337 1342; Young v Buckel 1864 2 M 1077; Goetze v Aders 1874 2 R 150; 
and Araya v Coghill 1921 SC 462), New Zealand (Cleve v Jacomb 1864 Mac 171) and 
England (Re Anderson 1911 1 KB 896). 
50  The Lehane 2015 case paras 23-24. 
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5.2 The standing of Lehane to apply to the South African court for 
recognition and assistance 
5.2.1 Different approaches to the issue of Mr Dunne's domicile 
Relevant to the issue of Lehane's standing to seek recognition and 
assistance from the South African courts was the question of Mr Dunne's 
domicile,51 a point disputed because of contradictory statements that he was 
still domiciled in Ireland rather than, as he averred, currently being domiciled 
in the United States. 
Yekiso J seemed ill at ease in dealing with the possibility that Mr Dunne 
might have been domiciled somewhere other than in Ireland.52 Still, it is 
noteworthy that Yekiso J53 mentioned Lehane's argument that "domicile is 
not an absolute requirement for his recognition", with reliance on Ex parte 
Palmer: In re Hahn,54 and included55 Berman J's reference in the Palmer 
case to Innes CJ's cautious finding in Re Estate Morris56 about recognising 
a non-domiciliary trustee in exceptional circumstances. Yet Yekiso J did not 
take this line of reasoning any further but simply concluded57 that the Irish 
domicile at the relevant point had been established and confirmed by the 
Irish High Court.58 One infers that Yekiso J did not consider that the present 
                                            
51  The Lagoon case para 25-26. 
52  The Lehane 2015 case paras 53-57. 
53  The Lehane 2015 case para 55. 
54  Ex parte Palmer: In re Hahn 1993 3 SA 359 (C) 364I-365B (hereafter the Palmer case). 
55  The Lehane 2015 case para 56 
56  Re Estate Morris 1907 TS 657 666 (hereafter the Morris case). 
57  The Lehane 2015 case para 57. 
58  Also compare Yekiso J's reference to the relevant finding by McGovern J in Ireland 
(the Lehane case 2015 paras 25, 55). In his judgment In the matter of Dunne (a 
Bankrupt) 2013 IEHC 583 (6 December 2013), McGovern J discussed the facts 
relevant to Mr Dunne's domicile at some length (paras 31-47), and paid particular 
regard to Mr Dunne's declaration to a representative of the petitioning bank on 8 
November 2010, "My Domicile is Ireland", a statement from which he had not sought 
to resile or which he had attempted to explain or clarify (para 46). For the purposes of 
the Irish bankruptcy petition, held the judge, Mr Dunne had thus been domiciled in 
Ireland within the preceding three years required (see paras 25-30). In the discussion 
of domicile on appeal, though, Lafoy J held that, strictly speaking, the debtor had to 
be shown to be domiciled at the date when the bankruptcy petition was presented, a 
matter of Irish law as the lex fori (In the matter of Sean Dunne (a Bankrupt) 2015 IESC 
42 (15 May 2015) para 66). The requirements of proving both the fact of residence 
and the intention to reside permanently or indefinitely as elements of the acquisition 
of a new domicile of choice were confirmed (with citation to, among others, In re Sillar, 
Hurley v Winbush 1956 IR 344 349). Lafoy J acknowledged that, as both parties 
realised, there was a conflict of evidence on Mr Dunne's domicile at the date of 
presentation of the petition (para 67), each litigant "implicitly [criticising] the other for 
not seeking to cross-examine the others' deponent or deponents on the issue of 
domicile" (para 67). Lafoy J criticised both litigants for not seeking leave to carry out 
such cross-examination. Lafoy J went on to point out one feature of the evidence that 
in her opinion prevented Mr Dunne from convincing the Irish court that he had acquired 
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circumstances fell within the scope of Innes CJ's cautious ruling in the 
Morris case. 
That cautious ruling and the possibility that it created in the Lehane matter 
were explored by Leach JA in more detail. He mentioned that recognition 
had been extended to trustees who had not been appointed by the 
domiciliary court.59 The uncertainty over the domicile and the American 
court's enlistment of the Irish legal system were regarded as constituting the 
exceptional circumstances.60 Leach JA warned that it was "not simply a 
matter of comity and convenience"61 which justified the South African courts 
helping in the present case; the further aspect was that it was "… also 
intimately bound up with the prima facie case made out against Mr Dunne 
for his being domiciled in Ireland". 
                                            
a domicile of choice in the USA: he resided in the USA in terms of an E2 visa. He had 
not advanced reasons for proving that he had acquired a domicile of choice, since his 
evidence "raises serious questions whether animus manendi could be or is 
established" (para 71). Lafoy J concluded this part of her judgment with the following 
observations (paras 71-72): "On the evidence, it is not possible to conclude that it was 
open to the Appellant [Mr Dunne] to form an intention to reside permanently or 
indefinitely in the United States of America prior to or on 12th February, 2013 which 
was capable of fulfilment at that time, nor is it possible to conclude that he had, in fact, 
formed such an intention given that, on his own evidence, he only took steps to acquire 
the right to remain permanently or indefinitely in the United States of America in 
reaction to Mr. Hurson's affidavit sworn on 28th August, 2013 which disclosed his legal 
status. … Apart from that point, a large number of factual matters are relied on by the 
Petitioner [Ulster Bank Ireland Limited] in support of its contention that the Appellant 
has not discharged the onus of proving that he has acquired a domicile of choice in 
the United States of America. Some of those factual matters were also outlined by the 
trial judge [McGovern J] in his judgment. Many of those matters demonstrate a 
continuing connection between the Appellant and this jurisdiction such as to lead to 
the conclusion that he has not established that he has abandoned his domicile of origin 
permanently and indefinitely." Again, it is submitted that these findings by McGovern 
at trial and Lafoy J on appeal show that the findings by Yekiso J and Leach JA that Mr 
Dunne had retained his Irish domicile were correct. Sinead O'Carroll wrote the 
following about the decision of the South African Supreme Court of Appeal: "The 
complicated ruling … focused on where Dunne's official place of residence is. Muddled 
by claims he lived in the US, Geneva and Ireland (at the same time), the court decided 
that the property developer’s domicile must for legal purposes be Ireland" (O'Carroll 
2015 http://tinyurl.com/h6wfuvo). It is submitted that the Supreme Court of Appeal, on 
the evidence, was not muddled over Mr Dunne's domicile, but correct in finding that 
he had failed to prove that he had given up his domicile in Ireland and acquired a new 
American domicile of choice. 
59  The Lagoon case para 31. 
60  The Lagoon case para 32. 
61  The Lagoon case para 32. 
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5.2.2 The significance of domicile in the recognition of foreign insolvency 
representatives 
5.2.2.1 The general principle regarding recognition of the domiciliary 
trustee 
The significance of domicile is now discussed. The general principle 
concerns the recognition of the domiciliary trustee. In the Palmer case62 
Berman J ruled that the debtor needed to be domiciled where the court 
granted the order, otherwise South African courts would not recognise the 
trustee appointed by that court. For this principle, Berman J relied on the 
ruling in the Morris case63 that  
… all our decisions hitherto have been based upon the fact that the 
sequestration order which we recognised and enforced was made at the 
domicile of the insolvent. It is only such an order which could, without the 
recognition of other Courts, have any operation outside the jurisdiction of the 
Court which granted it. 
Berman J followed up this point by saying that the general principle 
concerning the recognition of foreign trustees was trite law.64 
O'Brien argued65 that the Morris quotation was not authority for Berman J's 
ruling in Palmer on this point. Instead, the quotation concerned the orders 
that might automatically apply beyond the jurisdiction of the domiciliary 
court, without needing to be formally recognised. As O'Brien adds, it "does 
not follow that only orders made by the court of the insolvent's domicile may 
be recognised".66 First, it is submitted that foreign insolvency 
representatives, not foreign sequestration or liquidation proceedings, are 
recognised.67 Further, it is submitted that the possibility of recognising other 
foreign trustees is implied by the fact that in the Palmer case Berman J 
mentioned two possible exceptions to the general principle of recognising 
the domiciliary trustee. This submission would be consistent with O'Brien's 
observation. 
                                            
62  The Palmer case 361I. 
63  The Morris case 666. 
64  The Palmer case 365C-D, citing Farlam AJ in Smit v Abrahams 1992 3 SA 158 (C) 
180C-D. 
65  O'Brien "Transnational Aspects" 17. 
66  O'Brien "Transnational Aspects" 17. 
67  See O'Brien "Transnational Aspects" 14-15, discussing Ex parte Getliffe: In re 
Dominion Reefs Ltd 1965 4 SA 75 (T); Re African Farms Ltd 1906 TS 373; and Ex 
parte Robinson's Trustee 1910 TPD 25. 
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5.2.2.2 The first exception: submission of the non-domiciliary trustee 
to the local court's jurisdiction 
The first possible exception acknowledged by Berman J in the Palmer case 
was that recognition might be accorded if the insolvent had sought his 
sequestration in a country where he was not domiciled. Then his trustee – 
one infers, from that non-domiciliary jurisdiction – "… might … be able to 
obtain recognition in the country of the insolvent's domicile on the basis of 
the doctrine of submission".68 
This possibility was not discussed in detail in the Lehane matter, where Mr 
Dunne submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the American bankruptcy court 
by seeking bankruptcy under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. The reason 
that this possibility was not discussed may be that it was not relevant to the 
South African facts. The basis on which this possible exception might apply 
would be that the United States was not Mr Dunne's domicile at the time of 
the Irish bankruptcy proceedings, and that, instead, Ireland was that 
domicile, and the American trustee was seeking recognition in the Irish 
court. Mr Dunne was not domiciled at the Cape. So in applying to the South 
African court for recognition and assistance, Lehane was not applying, on 
the basis of the doctrine of submission, for recognition in the country of the 
insolvent's domicile. 
And how far does the authority relied on – the Richards case – in fact 
illustrate the principle for which it was cited in support of the first exception 
mentioned in the Palmer case? Doveton resided and was domiciled and had 
all his assets in the Cape Colony. He was not subject to the jurisdiction of 
the High Court of Griqualand. He gave his agent in Kimberley an ordinary 
general power of attorney. Process was served on that agent. The High 
Court of Griqualand gave judgment against Doveton and in July granted a 
compulsory sequestration order against his estate and appointed Richards 
as the trustee. A copy of the Griqualand sequestration was not sent to the 
Supreme Court of the Cape of Good Hope until December. 
Meanwhile, in September the High Court of Griqualand confirmed Richards 
as the trustee of the Griqualand estate. In addition, in September Doveton, 
who knew of the Griqualand sequestration order, had applied to surrender 
his estate in the Cape Colony. The Cape court was not informed of the 
Griqualand sequestration or Richards's appointment in that jurisdiction. In 
October the Cape court confirmed the appointment of the Cape trustees of 
Doveton's estate. 
                                            
68  Berman J in the Palmer case 364H-I cited Richards v Doveton's Trustees 1884 3 SC 
123 126 (hereafter the Richards case). 
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At no (prior) stage had the Cape court known of the Griqualand 
sequestration. Richards maintained that he did not know of the Cape 
proceedings, although they had been advertised. He applied to have the 
appointment of Doveton's Cape trustees set aside. The Griqualand power 
of attorney was not placed in evidence before the Cape court. 
In a short judgment, De Villiers CJ held that Richards had to prove that these 
Cape orders had been mistakenly granted and that the Cape court was 
obliged to give effect to the Griqualand court's order. Richards argued that 
Doveton had granted the agent in Kimberley the power of attorney with the 
general power of representation. De Villiers CJ held69 that Richards's 
argument would be sound if clearly the power of attorney was broad enough 
to entitle the agent to submit to the Griqualand court's jurisdiction. It had to 
be assumed that the relevant power of attorney was the standard one. The 
power of attorney would even be taken to confer on the general agent the 
power to accept service on the insolvent's behalf. Still, this power of attorney 
would not be broad enough for Richards's purposes, because  
… a bare authority to accept service means no more than an authority 
to accept service within the jurisdiction to which the person giving the 
authority is subject.70 
De Villiers CJ then distinguished the Richards case from the Howse case, 
where the insolvent firm had had two domiciles. In the Howse case,  
… it was held that upon the insolvency of the firm, and the appointment of a 
trustee in one domicile, the estate in the other domicile was vested in such 
trustee.71 
Yet in the Richards case, Doveton "never was amenable to the insolvency 
jurisdiction of the High Court" of Griqualand.72 The Griqualand appointment 
of Richards did not prevent the Cape court from appointing local trustees to 
manage the Cape estate that Doveton had surrendered. So Richards's 
application failed. 
Despite the conferring of the general power of attorney on the Kimberley 
agent, who received process there, it is noticeable that the Cape court, 
when belatedly informed of the pre-existing Griqualand court's 
sequestration order, did not recognise it. So the Richards case, on its facts, 
is not authority for the principle that a debtor may submit to the jurisdiction 
of the foreign court and then the trustee appointed to the relevant insolvent 
estate may rely on the resulting sequestration order as a basis sufficient in 
                                            
69  The Richards case 126. 
70  The Richards case 126. 
71  The Richards case 126. 
72  The Richards case 126. 
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a local court exercising jurisdiction over the debtor by virtue of his domicile 
and his property both being within the jurisdictional area of that local court. 
From dealing with the first exception to the general principle, the discussion 
moves on to the second exception to the general principle regarding the 
recognition of foreign insolvency representatives. 
5.2.2.3 The second exception: recognition of the non-domiciliary 
trustee in exceptional cases and for exceptional convenience 
The second possible exception to the general principle that Berman J 
discussed in the Palmer case73 was permitted by Innes CJ's cautious ruling 
in the Morris case. This second possibility was that the insolvent's 
domiciliary court might recognise a non-domiciliary trustee in exceptional 
cases and for exceptional convenience. Berman J mentioned three cases 
in this regard. These are now considered in turn.  
First, in Herman v Tebb,74 the estate of the debtor, Tebb, had been 
sequestrated in the Transvaal in 1911 and soon afterwards he came to live 
in the Cape, where he had subsequently been domiciled. Several years later 
he had been rehabilitated in the Transvaal.  
His immovable property was governed by Cape law. No Cape movable 
property had been acquired while he had been domiciled in the Transvaal, 
and so Cape law applied to all his property. Had sequestration occurred in 
the Cape, all his Cape property would vest in a Cape trustee. The Transvaal 
sequestration order, as regards its effect on property that Tebb had acquired 
in a domicile other than the Transvaal, should be seen as being issued by 
a non-domiciliary court, and thus could be effective regarding "property 
within the jurisdiction of the Court which pronounced it", the Transvaal.75 
The Cape property did not vest in the Transvaal trustee. 
Louwrens J held that he retained discretion to recognise the Transvaal 
trustee. Among other things, such recognition would lead to the debtor's 
losing a Cape liquor licence and prevent him from managing his Cape 
estate. The Transvaal trustee was not the domiciliary trustee, nor was he 
vested with any of Tebb's assets. The Transvaal law would apply to 
immovable property situated in the Transvaal if Tebb was still domiciled in 
the Transvaal. The Cape movables could not be dealt with or taken to the 
Transvaal unless the Cape court allowed this move. The Cape court could 
grant the order, subject to conditions; but that order, Louwrens J considered, 
                                            
73  The Palmer case 364I-365C. 
74  Herman v Tebb 1929 CPD 65 (hereafter the Herman case). 
75  The Herman case 72, Louwrens J citing the Morris case. 
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should not be granted if the administration of the estate and the handling of 
the assets would conflict with the law of the debtor's domicile and the place 
where his property was situated, or the policy of the legal system of that 
place.76 Such an extensive order should not be granted where the trustee 
was not vested with the assets, the debtor was solvent, and his Transvaal 
creditors could sue him for their debts by means of other remedies. The only 
two Transvaal creditors' claims had prescribed under Cape law as the lex 
fori. Louwrens J thus refused to recognise the Transvaal trustee. 
It is acknowledged that in broad terms Louwrens J did consider whether the 
Cape court could recognise the trustee. He decided against doing so. The 
principle that the application for recognition could be entertained can be 
deduced from the circumstances of the case; but, as far as the after-
acquired movable property in the Cape was concerned, one infers that 
those circumstances were not so extraordinary as to render it appropriate 
for the Cape court to recognise the Transvaal trustee, who had been 
appointed so many years previously. 
The second case cited by Berman J in the Palmer case was the Rhodesian 
case of M T D (Mangula) Ltd v Frost and Power: Ex parte Power.77 There 
the South African court had appointed a curator bonis to manage the 
debtor's affairs. There was no proof whether the debtor (who it seems was 
solvent but old and unable to manage his affairs) had been domiciled in 
South Africa or somewhere else when the Rhodesian application for 
recognition was heard. This point was disputed.78 The South African curator 
bonis still applied to the Rhodesian court regarding the Rhodesian estate, 
and was recognised. This Rhodesian decision in the M T D (Mangula) case 
illustrates the possibility that the local court may recognise the foreign 
representative who may not be proved to be the domiciliary trustee, 
provided that he still takes care to apply for recognition to the local court and 
does not make the mistake of attempting to deal with the local assets without 
such recognition, or even of being slow to make the application for 
recognition as were the Zambian liquidators in the Ward case. The 
Rhodesian decision in the M T D (Mangula) case illustrates a generous 
approach to recognising a foreign representative. It is also noticeable that 
the court in the M T D (Mangula) case intended its order of recognition to 
apply to property whether movable or immovable. 
                                            
76  Compare Bertelsmann et al Mars para 30.8 n34. 
77  M T D (Mangula) Ltd v Frost and Power: Ex parte Power 1966 2 SA 713 (R) (hereafter 
the M T D (Mangula) case). 
78  The M T D (Mangula) case 716H. 
A SMITH  PER / PELJ 2016 (19)  17 
The third case cited by Berman J in the Palmer case – Ex parte Singer: In 
re Insolvent Estate Skeen79 – also has some interesting features. The 
debtor had previously resided in the Transvaal, moved to Natal, and then 
moved again to the Cape and died there. The Transvaal trustee applied to 
the Natal court for recognition so that he might deal with the debtor's 
movable property and immovable property in Natal. In the absence of proof 
of the debtor's Transvaal domicile, Beaumont J held that the debtor had 
been domiciled in Natal when he died.80 
The Natal court recognised the Transvaal trustee as being able to deal with 
the Natal movable property,81 a decision not challenged on appeal. Again, 
when the Singer case is compared with the Herman case, it is clear that it 
was the non-domiciliary trustee from the Transvaal who was seeking 
recognition from the Natal court. So to that extent the decision bears out the 
principle that the non-domiciliary trustee may still be recognised by the court 
of the debtor's domicile, as regards movable property. But the outcome for 
the Transvaal trustee in the Singer case was different from the outcome for 
the Transvaal trustee in the Herman case. Although both the debtors were 
held to have acquired new domiciles in Herman and Singer, it is submitted 
that the point of distinction was the lapse of a considerable period of time in 
Herman. 
Further, in the Singer case the Natal court also had to decide the position 
regarding the debtor's immovable property situated in Natal. In this respect, 
the appeal court in the Singer case (Bale CJ, Dove-Wilson J and Broome J) 
reached a decision different from the decision that had been reached 
regarding the Natal movable property. It was acknowledged that the Natal 
court exercised jurisdiction over this immovable property. As regards 
whether the Natal court should in comity recognise the Transvaal trustee, 
the court followed the decision of the Transvaal Supreme Court in Ex parte 
Stegmann.82 The appeal court in the Singer case declined to set aside the 
decision reached by Beaumont J in the exercise of his discretion. The 
appeal court gave various reasons (including the finding that Skeen had 
been domiciled in Natal and not the Transvaal) why it would be convenient 
for the immovable property to be dealt with in Natal.83 Accordingly, this part 
of the judgment and the order of the court of appeal state the general 
principle regarding the treatment of immovable property. It is submitted that 
                                            
79  Ex parte Singer: In re Insolvent Estate Skeen 1905 26 NLR 536 (hereafter the Singer 
case). 
80  The Singer case 547. 
81  The Singer case 538. 
82  Ex parte Stegmann 1902 TS 40. See the Singer case 545-547. 
83  The Singer case 547. 
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this part of the judgment in the Skeen case does not fall within the exception 
acknowledged by the cautious language of Innes CJ in the Morris case. 
In the Palmer case,84 Berman J held that comity and convenience were not 
a separate ground for a South African court to recognise a foreign trustee 
"regardless of any consideration given to the" domicile of the insolvent. This 
factor explains why Leach JA referred to Lehane's prima facie case 
establishing Mr Dunne's Irish domicile.85 However, as the Rhodesian case 
of M T D (Mangula) and the old Natal case of Singer show (at least in relation 
to the movable property in the Singer case), recognition may be accorded if 
the non-domiciliary foreign representative does apply to the local court for 
such recognition. The lack of proof of the required domicile may not be fatal 
to the success of the application. But it appears that the application by the 
non-domiciliary trustee for recognition must be prompt, otherwise this 
trustee faces the obstacle of another rule of cross-border insolvency law, 
that property acquired after the insolvent has acquired a new domicile of 
choice does not vest in the trustee appointed in his previous domicile.86 If 
this conclusion is correct, then domicile is seen to continue to play a decisive 
role in the decision whether to recognise and assist a foreign insolvency 
representative. 
6 Conclusion 
This case comment has discussed some aspects of the relief that South 
African courts are prepared to grant to foreign representatives. These 
parties seek the required recognition so as to be allowed to deal with South 
African assets. The terms of the relief granted to the foreign insolvency 
representative in the Lehane matter are wide, opening up the possible 
application of section 21 of the Insolvency Act to the facts, an outcome that 
would greatly assist a foreign trustee such as Lehane if he sought to 
convince the South African court that the insolvent spouse's transfer of 
property to the solvent spouse was an invalid donation at the time that it 
was made. 
At the same time, the territorial nature of the South African order in Lehane 
is observed by its restricting the claims of creditors to those whose whole 
                                            
84  The Palmer case 365C. 
85  The Lagoon case para 32. 
86  The Herman case. This principle regarding property acquired in a new domicile of 
choice may also be seen in operation in the Morris case, where the debtor had 
creditors and immovable property in Rhodesia but had moved to the Transvaal and 
acquired a domicile and movable property in that state; and it was held that although 
a non-domiciliary trustee could be recognised, the court in its discretion should on the 
balance of convenience not recognise and assist the Rhodesian trustee in the 
circumstances of the case. 
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cause of action arose in South Africa. This paragraph of the order rules out 
the possibility of cross-filing by a creditor with a foreign cause of action who 
wishes to claim for the amount, or the balance, of a claim made in a foreign 
jurisdiction. This cross-filing would not be allowed even to a creditor from 
the debtor's domicile, whether the United States or the Republic of Ireland, 
in the Lehane matter. It follows that this paragraph of the Cape court order 
would also rule out the claim of a South African creditor whose whole cause 
of action had not arisen in South Africa. 
The finding that the automatic stay conferred by the relevant provision of 
the Bankruptcy Code in the United States did not apply in South Africa was 
correct. Yet the significance of the question was seen to wane when on 
appeal it was pointed out that the American and the Irish trustees were 
collaborating. The American trustee's approval of the South African 
proceedings constituted a further lifting of the American worldwide 
automatic stay, even supposing that it did apply to the type of proceedings 
undertaken by Lehane in South Africa. 
The question of Mr Dunne's domicile was dealt with on the basis that this 
was in Ireland rather than America. This was the finding of Yekiso J, who 
did not explore the question of whether recognition might still be accorded 
to Lehane if Mr Dunne were domiciled in America. Instead, this aspect was 
discussed more thoroughly by Leach JA in the light of the conflicting 
statements over the domicile of Mr Dunne, although the judge similarly 
concluded that on the facts Mr Dunne had retained his Irish domicile and 
not acquired a new domicile in America. Even as regards the recognition of 
a non-domiciliary trustee, the question of the domicile of the debtor is seen 
to be an important factor, as the discussion of the cases with respect to the 
two exceptions mentioned in the Palmer case shows. 
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